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"Form and function should be one,
joined in a spiritual union"
Frank Lloyd Wright
PROTECTING THE FORM BUT NOT THE
FUNCTION:
IS U.S. LAW READY FOR A NEW MODEL?
Dana Beldiman
Introduction
As our society develops, it produces new and different kinds of
intangible goods. However, many of the mechanisms available to
protect such goods date back hundreds of years and are inadequate
and in desperate need of an overhaul in order to adapt to the new
realities of our world. Overly rapid doctrinal expansion can result in
negative collateral effects, such as lack of precisely defined standards
and blurring of boundaries between doctrines. Such side-effects risk
disturbing the delicate balance between free competition and
protection that underlies the structure of our intellectual property
laws. The growth of intellectual property protection must therefore
involve a constant rebalancing between the interests of creators and
those of the public at large.
One of the areas that has undergone rapid change in recent years
is protection of product design. Pressured by systemic demands for
stronger protection mechanisms, judicial decisions have dramatically
broadened the scope of protection, in particular in the area of trade
dress law. Many of these decisions, however, are rendered in an
immature doctrinal environment, characterized by the use of
imprecisely defined concepts and doctrines that are incongruous with
the needs of the intellectual property to be protected. This incongruity
between problem and solution can create precedents that threaten the
balance between free competition and protection. That balance can be
restored, however, by limiting trade dress protection and
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implementing specialized design protection mechanisms. Legislative
models for more closely tailored protection mechanisms exist, and
should be considered.
Summary
Part I. Our society continually produces new types of intellectual
property ("IP"). The protection required by these new types of IP
drives existing IP laws to relentless expansion. The effects of rapid
growth of legal doctrines can easily disturb the balance between free
competition and protection by forcing a new problem into an old
solution. Part I of this paper delves into the manifestations of
doctrinal expansion. Such symptoms include a change in the
underlying function of the laws, convergence of doctrines (in
particular copyright and trademarks which are the focus of this
paper), blurred doctrinal dividing lines, creation of hybrid judicial
monopolies that are immune to the limitations of either doctrine, and
the use of protection mechanisms that do not fit the needs of the
particular form of IP to be protected.
Part II discusses a type of claim that has emerged in recent years
and is pushing protection under the Lanham Act beyond its originally
intended scope. The "type of look" protection, a variety of product
design, covers not individual products, but rather the common
elements of an entire line of products. In a crowded marketplace,
distinctive design plays an increasingly important role as product
differentiator. Designer articles are particularly vulnerable to copying
because, unlike an internal mechanical part or a chemical
composition, they wear their ingenuity on the outside, for all to see.
This section then discusses three lines of conceptually related cases,
in which protection is extended to an entire line of items in the areas
of visual art, music and utilitarian product design.
Part III analyzes the two defining elements of trade dress: non-
functionality and distinctiveness. These elements present the
following four problems with respect to product design "type of look"
cases:
(1) most courts eschew the aesthetic functionality analysis,
because no standards for application exist. Although in some
cases its application could help limit the scope of trade dress
protection, opinions on the need for this doctrine are mixed;
(2) the basic requirement for "type of look" protection is
"precise expression" of the claimed design, however no
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criteria exist to define the requisite level of precision. As a
result, courts can easily factor in extraneous, and sometimes
inappropriate, considerations;
(3) the legal concept of distinctiveness is too easily confused
with a design's striking appearance and the line between the
aesthetic function of the design and its source indicative
function is virtually impossible to draw;
(4) while resting on sound principles, the rule that requires a
showing of secondary meaning for product design
essentially eliminates trade dress as a method for protection
of most of product design.
These factors, in addition to the incongruity between the
protection offered by trade dress and the needs of holders of design
rights, lead to the conclusion that trade dress is not the optimal
method for protection of "type of look," IP, and, possibly for product
design in general. This paper reviews a spectrum of IP protected
under trademark/trade dress law, in decreasing order of source
indicative information content, with word marks at one end and "type
of look" at the other. At a given point in that spectrum, distinctiveness
becomes so tenuous as to suggest that trade dress protection for
product design, including "type of look" be cut off.
Part IV considers whether product design should be protected by
methods other than design patent, trademark, or copyright. Existing
models of industrial design protection laws are reviewed, including
TRIPS, the EU design laws, the German models Gebrauchsmuster
and Geschmacksmuster, and the Vessel Hull Protection Amendment
to the Copyright Act. The review indicates that there is much greater
congruity between the needs of product design owners and the
industrial design protection laws, than in trade dress law. Continued
use of an improper mechanism to protect product design disturbs the
delicate balance between free competition and protection sought by
the existing IP laws, and may result in judicial monopolies which
remove valuable assets from the public domain for generations.
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Part I
THE RELENTLESS EXPANSION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS-DO NEW TIMES DEMAND NEW TOOLS?
One of the main characteristics of an information society is that
it produces wealth that comes in intangible form. Statistics show that
in the past 20 years the value of intangible assets in leading US
businesses has more than tripled.' These assets demand protection. As
new protection mechanisms are created and adapted to the newly
created forms of IP, 2 IP laws expand and new laws are created.
US IP law has been resistant to change due to Congress's
reluctance to legislate new types of protection. By way of example,
the U.S. has declined to adopt legislation implementing international
treaties, such as certain aspects of TRIPS,3 Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention,4 and the European Database Directive. 5 With respect to
protection of product design, the US takes the position that the
existing patent, copyright and trademark laws offer adequate
protection with respect to design protection. This means that new
realities and concepts have to be handled within the existing set of
traditional IP doctrines, which are consequently being manipulated to
fit these new advancements.
A multitude of policy considerations factor into the decision
whether to create new forms of protection. On the one hand, new
1. Sharyn Ch'ang & Marina Yastreboff, Discover Your Invisible Advantage, LES
NOUVELLES, JOURNAL OF THE LICENSING EXECUTIVES SOCIETY, Mar. 2003 at 33.
2. Copyright: A Radical Rethink, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 2003 (noting the many
difficult issues raised by the spread of the intemet and related technologies).
3. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. V, 108 Stat. 4809,
4973-90 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., and 35
U.S.C.). The U.S. enacted amendments to conform to TRIPS in a law passed on December 8,
1994. See also Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Uruguay
Round Table Agreements, Texts of Agreements Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative
Action and Required Supporting Statements 1-2 (1994).
4. Berne Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, art.
6 bi,, S. Treaty Doe. No. 99-27, 41. The U.S. Copyright Act does not recognize moral rights,
except in a very limited provision applicable to creations of visual art. Visual Artists' Rights
Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A.
5. Council Directive 96/9 EC, 1996, O.J. (L 77/20). See F.W.Grosheide, Symposium on
Intellectual Property, Digital Technology and Electronic Commerce: Digital Copyright and
Database Protection: Database Protection-The European Way, 8 Wash. U. J.L. & POL'Y 39,
45 (2002) (arguing that copyright and the sui generis database protection can apply
simultaneously).
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forms of IP protection pose a potential threat to innovation and
competition. On the other, use of a protection mechanism that does
not meet the needs of a particular type of IP can result in undesired
effects even more harmful to innovation and competition than
narrowly tailored new laws.
Each form of protection is a finely tuned instrument, geared to
achieve a particular policy goal. The U.S. Constitution requires
Congress to secure "to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries" in order to "promote the
progress of science and useful arts.",6 An exclusivity period granted
under defined circumstances secures a fair return for the authors'
creative labor,7 and operates as an incentive to further creation. This
policy underlies Congressional legislation to protect inventions 8 and
creations, 9 and is undoubtedly responsible for much of the progress of
our society. Patent and copyright laws are about incentives to invent
and to create.' 0 Trademark and unfair competition law is about the
efficient operation of the market." Its rules are intended to enable
consumers to recognize and repurchase goods with which they have
previously been satisfied. 12 As a by-product, the product's maker
reaps the rewards of the reputation it has built.
The policies underlying these laws date back hundreds of years
and are as valid today as they were at the time of their inception. The
most important consideration in deciding whether to expand old laws,
as opposed to creating new protection mechanisms, is to not disturb
the delicate balance between the interest of rights owners and those of
the public at large that draws from the public domain.
Innovation and creation require access to essential building
blocks, 13 which must remain in the public domain. Our culture and
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
7. See Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1677 n.92 (1999)
(citing Ralph Brown, Eligibility for Copyright: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN L.
REV. 579 (1985)).
8. See generally Patent Code, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1-376 (West 2001).
9. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 101-1332 (West 2001).
10. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997).
11. Denicola, supra note 7, at 1663.
12. 3 Louis ALTAMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES BY RUDOLFF CALMAN § 17.01, at 17-1 to 17-3 (4th ed. 1998); 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:3 at 2-3 (4th ed.
2000).
13. Doris E. Long, First, "Let's Kill All the Intellectual Property Lawye#-s! ": Musings on
the Decline and Fall of the Intellectual Property Empire, 34 MARSHALL L. REV. 851, 888
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civilization draw heavily on the public domain's accumulated wisdom
of the ages. Its wealth can be maintained only by increasing the stock
of knowledge and of art. 14 No progress can take place if the world is
not allowed to build on the work of its predecessors. The situation
has been aptly described by a statement that "a dwarf standing on the
shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself.' 5 IP laws
are designed to let the dwarf build on what the giant has
accomplished.
The history and growth of IP protection is a story of constant
efforts to balance and re-balance the competing interests of creators
and the public. 16 It is a never-ending story, accompanying the
relentless expansion of IP laws.
1. The Insatiable Lanham Act
Since the enactment of the Lanham Act in 1947, trademark
rights have witnessed a huge expansion both substantively and
procedurally. 17
Originally, trademark was a doctrine that granted protection to
word marks. Over the years it has come to cover color, sound, labels,
packaging, two dimensional design objects, three dimensional design
objects, art, lines of product, etc. in the guise of "words, names,
symbols or devices."1 8 It supports blocking registrations in order to
reserve marks for future use, 19 and it applies to bad faith in
cyberspace. 20 Likelihood of confusion, a concept originally meant for
(2000). Essential building blocks include in the instance of trademarks, generic terms for the
goods and services being offered, factors are listed in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976)). Traffix Devices v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S.
23 (2001) (discussing aesthetic and utilitarian elements of trade dress).
14. Denicola, supra note 7 at 1676 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151,156 (1975)).
15. Long, supra note 13, at 873 (quoting Zacharia Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of
Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511 (1945).
16. Long, supra note 13, at 890.
17. Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1384
(1987) (noting a proliferation of application of Lanham Act § 43(a)).
18. The Lanham Act is intended to make "actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
marks" and "to protect persons engaged in... commerce against unfair competition." Lanham
Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2001).
19. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1697 (1999) (citing examples of blocking reservations such as "class of 2000"
and "Titanic").
20. Anti-Cybersquating Consumer Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(I)(A)(i) (2000).
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the protection of the consumer, now also applies to third parties' post
sale confusion and inures to the protection of the mark owner.21
Starting out as a doctrine meant to protect against marks which
cause a likelihood of confusion among competing products,
trademark has become a doctrine which protects against the "gradual
whittling away and dispersion of the identity" 22 in non-competing
products without a need for likelihood of confusion.23 The doctrine
has now come to be used to restrict such legitimate uses as
comparative advertising 24 and parodies directed at the trademark
owner.
25
As owners of designs began to migrate to the new trade dress
doctrine in order to avoid both the stringent formalities and costly
prosecution of the design patents, 26 and the uncertainty of copyright
protection for useful articles, 27 trademark laws grew to allow outright
ownership of phrases, useful objects, designs and style, and to prevent
their use regardless of context.28
2. The Expanding Copyright Act
Copyright law has seen an equal expansion. Its magnitude is
illustrated by the length and complexity of the Copyright Act.29
As framed, copyright afforded protection to "writings" and
"authors." 30 Writings has now come to include a range of creative
21. Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108-09 (2d Cir.
2000); Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989-90 (2d Cir. 1993).
22. Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. R. 813,
825 (1927).
23. See generally, Denicola, supra note 8, at 1664-66. See Beverly W. Pattishall, The
Dilution Rationale for Trademark -Trade Identity Protection, Its Progess and Prospects, 71 Nw.
U.L.REV. 618 (1976) (explaining the history of the dilution statutes). See also an amendment of
the Lanham Act in 1996, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)& 1127.
24. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (enjoining a parody of a
competitor's advertisement).
25. Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (enjoining the use
of plaintiffs trademarks in a parody advertisement alluding to environmental problems).
26. See infra text accompanying note 90.
27. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc. 632 F. 2d 989, 992 (2d Cir. 1980).
28. See Lemley supra note 19, at 1696.
29. Denicola, supra note 7, at 1683.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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works, from photographs 3' to computer programs,
32 useful articles, 33
computer chips, 34 and sound recordings.
35
The Copyright Acts went from prohibiting literal copying to
covering work with the same "concept and feel.
3 6
Introduction of new technology has resulted in new laws
amending the Copyright Act, such as the Audio Home Recording Act
of 1992, 37 which prohibits sale of digital audio recording devices, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 38 which forbids circumvention
of technological measures, 39 now criticized for impinging on the
public domain and free speech.
The Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), also referred to as
the Sonny Bono Act, was lobbied for by copyright owners, 40 and
extends the terms of all copyrights for 20 years,41 both prospectively
and retrospectively.42
In short, copyright, like trademark law, suffers from what has
,43been termed a "doctrinal creep'.
31. See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000).
32. 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West 1996).
33. Id. at § 101.
34. Id. at § 902.
35. Id. at § 102(a)(7).
36. See Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2002).
37. Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001(1)-(10) (1992) (prohibiting the
importation, manufacture, distribution of digital audio recording devices unless the devices are
equipped to prevent "serial copying").
38. 17 U.S.C § 1201 (1999).
39. SHELDON HALPERN, COPYRIGHT LAW-PROTECTION OF ORIGINAL EXPRESSION,
Carolina Academic Press, at 240 (2002). The law makes actionable circumventing
technological measures that effectively controls access to copyright protected work and
trafficking in such technology, as well as interfering with copyright management information.
40. Brenda Sandburg, U.S. Law Extending Copyrights Upheld, THE RECORDER, Feb. 21,
2001 ("The CTEA was supported by every group of creators and copyright owners you can
imagine").
41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), (c) and 304 (creating terms for works after 1978, life of the
author plus 70 years, 120 years from creation and 95 years from publication for anonymous, or
pseudonymous or is work made for hire).
42. The Act, intended to harmonize U.S. copyright law with the European Copyright
Directive, has been generally regarded as benefiting primarily large rights holders, and therefore
also termed the "Mickey Mouse." Its purported policy rationale of providing greater incentives
for creation, has met skepticism from commentators as well as the Supreme Court, who
questioned how an extra twenty years of protection after the author's death incentivizes creation.
Long, supra note 13, at 867. Nonetheless the Act survived judicial scrutiny in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 1505; 155 L. Ed. 2d 243 (2003).
43. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L.J. 1687, 1698 (1999).
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COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF EXPANSION
One way in which the "doctrinal creep" becomes manifest is
further expansion of already inflated doctrines to cover new forms of
IP. Often there is no natural congruity between the needs of the new
form of IP and the function and scope of the doctrine selected.44
Despite efforts to force existing theories to protect new IP, what
results is the transformation of the laws' underlying functions,
convergence of the doctrines, and a blurring of the dividing lines
between them. 4
1. Convergence of Functions
With the trend toward stronger protection, the underlying
functions of individual IP laws gradually erode and the laws are
transformed into pure investment protection instruments.46 Copyright
protection is meant to stimulate artistic creativity of authors, but has
become largely an instrument to maximize the returns of authors and
publishers.47  The trademark/unfair competition doctrine is intended
to protect consumers from trickery or deceit,48 but as currently
applied, this doctrine has become a mechanism by which companies
recoup advertising and marketing expenses.
2. Convergence of Doctrines
The convergence of function is accompanied by the convergence
of the doctrines themselves. This applies particularly to doctrines such
as copyright and trademark, which naturally complement each other
44. For instance, software requires protection for the span of its useful life, on an average
3-5 years, yet the protection term under copyright law is life plus 70 or 120 years from creation.
17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), (c) and 304. Similarly, industrial design protected under trade dress law is
not a good fit. See infra text accompanying notes 229-232.
45. See Michael Todd Helfand, When Mickey Mouse is as Strong as Superman: the
Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial
Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1992) (arguing that convergence of copyrights and
trademarks is manifest by the courts functionally merging tests of infringement; use of similar
language and reasoning and tacking on claims to favorable rulings on other claims).
46. Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age,
108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1725 (1999) ("There has been inexorable pressure to recognize as an
axiom the principle that if something appears to have substantial value to someone, the law must
and should protect it as property").
47. See Denicola, supra note 7, at 1676 (citing Ralph S. Brown, Eiigibility for Copyright:
a SearchJbr Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579 (1985)).
48. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:3 (4th ed. 2000).
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by covering discrete needs. 49 Certain types of property lend
themselves to dual protection by copyright and trademarks, covering
the expressive unit and the function as source indicator, respectively.
Such types of IP include graphic representations of persons or
characters, literary works and their titles 50 and certain aspects of
visual art and three dimensional design objects.5' Works originally
covered by copyright may gain trademark significance by use as a
symbol of origin, and obtain trademark coverage upon expiration of
the copyright. As long as each doctrine adheres to its function, and
protects different aspects of an item, the two doctrines complement
each other in a salutary manner.
52
Dual use however may have a less salutary effect, when it results
in the interchangeable use of language and reasoning, merger of
infringement tests and hybrid judicially created monopolies, which
are not subject to the limitations of either doctrine.53 An example in
point is the case of Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theaters.
54
The plaintiffs trademark registration of the name "Tarzan" was the
basis for precluding third party use of this mark. The court reasoned
that "famous character names in copyrighted works may not be used
by others during the life of the copyright without authorization of the
copyright proprietor., 55  Without the benefit of conducting a
likelihood of confusion or substantial similarity analysis, the court
granted a trademark-like protection that is immune to charges of
copyright infringement, or to defenses of abandonment 56 or fair use.
49. Copyright law protects original expression in literary and artistic works. 17 U.S.C. §
102(a). Trademark law prevents confusion as to the source of goods. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra
note 48, § 2:3.
50. Such as books, magazines, movies, records.
51. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (holding a design of a lamp protectable under
copyright law).
52. Some intellectual property can function as identifier of source as well as expressive
unit and can therefore implicate both doctrines without overlap or conflict. Tristar Pictures, Inc.
v. Del Taco, Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1091 (C.D. Cal. 1999); MCCARTHY, supra note 48, at 6-8
(citing Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 29 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1241, 1246 (7th Cir. 1993)
("Courts have consistently held that a product's different qualities can be protected
simultaneously, or successively, by more than one of the statutory means for protection of IP").
53. See generally Helfand, supra note 45. See infra text accompanying notes 162-163.
54. 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
55. Id.
56. See Helfand supra note 45, at 647-48.
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3. The Blurring of Distinctions Between Copyrights and
Trademarks
Failure to strictly observe doctrinal dividing lines results in
interchangeability of concepts. As illustrated in the following case,
the Lanham Act can be called upon to perform a trademark function.
In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC),57
the creators of the television series "Monty Python's Flying Circus"
complained that ABC had drastically shortened the programs, and
edited the profanity from them for rebroadcast in America. They sued
for copyright infringement and mutilation of the work in violation of
the Lanham Act. The right to prevent mutilation and modification of
one's work is a right recognized under the Berne Convention.58
However, the U.S. has not implemented this rule, a fact which
effectively leaves Monty Python without remedy. The Second Circuit
avoided this roadblock by giving the Lanham Act an expansive
construction, sufficient to protect against mutilation of artistic works
as a false designation of origin of goods.59  The court found that
ABC's edits presented the work in a form that substantially departed
from the original work, and that "to deform [the creator's] work is to
present him to the public as the creator of work that is not his own."
60
Presentation in this manner would create a false impression of the
product's origin in violation of Section 43(a).
This treatment of moral rights was subsequently validated during
the debate to amend the Copyright Act to include "moral rights" in
conformance with the Berne Convention. Congress concluded that an
express provision for moral rights was unnecessary, given the judicial
expansion of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,61 citing Gilliam v.
ABC. Thus Section 43(a) remains a permanent "gap filler" for the
near-absence of moral rights in the Copyright Act. Gilliam illustrates
that the dividing lines between trademarks and copyrights are so
57. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
58. Berne Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, art.
6 bs, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 41. The Copyright Act contains does not recognize moral rights,
except in a very limited provision not applicable to motion pictures or TV series. Visual Artists'
Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1996).
59. The court noted that American copyright law does not recognize a cause of action for
violation of artists' moral rights that would protect against unauthorized changes in the work.
See Halpern, supra note 39, at 228. See also Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26-27.
60. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
61. Halpern, supra note 39, at 233 (citing Brown, Adherence to the Berne Copyright
Convention: The Moral Rights Issue, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOCIETY 196 (1988)).
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porous that the two doctrines can function virtually interchangeably in
given circumstances.
4. Use of the Wrong Protection Tool
Protection mechanisms must be adapted to the new forms of IP
our society produces. Lack of congruity between the tools used and
the needs of the IP lead, on the one hand, to excessive protection,
which unnecessarily impinges on free competition and, on the other,
to failure to meet the needs for protection, all of which results in
economic inefficiency. 62 Furthermore, in order to accommodate the
needs of new IP, courts strain the analysis to make things "fit,"
stretching concepts beyond their original meaning.
Rapid expansion also affects the definiteness of standards. Due
to constant expansion, doctrines have little time to mature, with the
result that concepts are not clearly defined, no distinguishing
terminology exists,63 and dividing lines become blurred.
The absence of clearly defined standards causes them to be
misapplied, giving fact finders more leeway in making ultimate
decisions. Considerations of fairness, sympathy and other visceral
reactions can come into play.64 All of this creates a general
environment of uncertain legal standards and unpredictable outcomes.
Transaction costs increase because additional resources are devoted to
compensate for the lack of predictability.6 5
Part II
PROTECTING THE "TYPE OF LOOK"66?
Expanded protection is fuelled by the creation of new types of
IP, resulting in efforts to "stretch" the existing doctrines. Lawsuits
which attempt to stretch existing doctrines far beyond their originally
intended scope are presented to courts on a regular basis. Even if
initial attempts to assert a particular new spin on a theory are fruitless,
62. See infra text accompanying notes 241-244.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 196-202.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 208-210.
65. Transaction costs between consumer and producer increased, because resources are
expended to achieve added predictability, both producer and consumer lose in the process.
66. Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1999). The
Second Circuit recognized that plaintiff owner of trade dress rights can have a claim for the
"Samara type of look."
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the persistent pressure and passage of time eventually erodes the
doctrine's original borders and open the door to broad protection.6 7
A claim that has seen significant growth in the past year is the
"type of look" claim, attempting to protect a category of product
design. 68  Its main characteristic is that it covers not just a single
product, but an entire line of products having the same features.
1. Increased Role of Design in Contemporary Society
"Type of look" claims arise mainly in the area of industrial
design, but extend into art, and even music. As markets become
increasingly crowded, producers of goods are looking to design as a
product differentiator. Increased investment in production of designer
goods results in more designer products on the market and in
consumers' tastes becoming more sophisticated. Our society
currently has an insatiable appetite for designer articles, ranging from
designer clothes to designer faucets to designer vehicles. 69  Basic
articles of everyday use, such as bottle openers, computers and stereo
systems command a higher price based on distinctive sleek design.
Manufacturers hire designers70 in order to increase their cachet, stores
hire architects to design flagship showrooms 7' and TV channels
named "Style" and "Design" are launched. As industrial design is
accepted as a creative activity that is valuable to society, design
museums are established in major cities of the world.72
Design can give a product the necessary competitive edge it
needs in a crowded market, which makes it an important ingredient in
a product's commercial success. Good product design can result in
product that is reliable and easy to use; it can give an aesthetic appeal,
style and image to the product. The more designer products are
67. See Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2001); See also text
accompanying notes 166-173.
68. The terminology is not entirely clear. This type of claim is referred to varyingly as
"overall look," "type of look," "the look and feel," "concept and feel" or "style."
69. The Great Design Issue, ARCHITECTUAL DIGEST, May 2003, at 53 (celebrating "the
eternal spirit of innovation that guides the world's greatest designers in their work").
70. DAILY NEWS RECORD, Sept. 10, 2001 (Target Stores have exclusive deals with
famous designers Todd Oldham, Michael Graves, and Mossimo).
71. Blair Kamin, New York stories of flagship stores; Gehry's design is on the money
while Koolhaas" 'costly wave' flags, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 7, 2002, at 6 (Miyake hires
architect Frank Gehry to design flagship New York store; Prada retains Rem Koolhaas for
Manhattan flagship).
72. Smithsonian Cooper-Hewitt National Design Museum, London Design Museum,
Munich-Die Pinakothek der Moderne, among others.
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created, the more they penetrate into public use, and in turn fuel the
demand for such products.
From an IP protection standpoint, the problem is that product
design bears its know-how on its face, because its ingenuity is openly
displayed. For this reason, design can be imitated relatively quickly
and inexpensively. This is of great concern to companies which
invest heavily in the development and commercialization of new
product designs. Consider the case of company A which has been in
the business of selling children's clothes for many years. Company A
hires a designer to create a particularly attractive line of clothing
which becomes the lifeblood of the company. A competitor,
company B, buys samples of the entire line of garments produced by
company A. B then contracts with a Philippine company to replicate
the garments, and sells millions of dollars worth of the clothes, while
A's sales plummet.
73
This is not an uncommon occurrence. Cheap imitations of
designer goods are easily produced in countries with low labor rates.
They can be placed on the market with astonishing speed and at low
prices, long before the originator has had a chance to recoup its
investment in the creation of the design.74 To survive, the originator
must seek some form of protection.
2. "Type of Look "--How Far Does it Extend?
The fact that design features frequently extend over an entire line
of products gave rise to the "type of look" theory. "Type of look"
claims also involve other kinds of creative activity, such as art and
music, in which creators lay claim to the "style" or type of look of
their creations, be it visual or musical.
Most of the "type of look" claims are brought as trade dress
claims under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.75 Unlike traditional
trade dress protection of product design, which protects a single
product, the "type of look" protection extends to the "recognizable
and consistent overall look" 76 across an entire line or series of
73. This hypothetical is patterned after the facts of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
74. Counterfeiting-In Praise of the Real Thing, THE ECONOMIST, May, 17 2003, at 12
("Copying is a profitable business: it needs no R&D and no expensive advertising campaigns.
Just copy a popular product, sell it at a discount and rake in the returns. This simple business
model, when combined with new technologies, free trade and the rising value of brands, is
opening a far broader range of consumer goods and markets to enterprising copycats").
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
76. Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Swanson, 235 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2000).
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products characterized by the same features. Products for which
protection has been sought include a line of outdoor furniture,77 the
look of video packaging for seventeen animated films, 78 the
appearance of labels on a line of decorative candles, 79 a line of
children's clothes,8 ° a line of handbags,81 the visual style of an artist's
work,82 the layout of a chain of pool halls,83 and the musical style of a
performer's signature recording.
84
Concerns about hindering competition are a serious
consideration in granting trade dress protection, even for individual
products.85 This concern is heightened in "type of look" cases,
because such claims are broader in scope. 86  The precise scope of
protection of "type of look" is still unclear, but it could be extremely
broad. To illustrate, consider a line of penguin shaped bar ware,
consisting of a cocktail shaker, a bottle opener, a corkscrew, a
strainer, a.o. Most likely the "type of look" would cover a third
party's penguin shaped bottle opener, and a fourth party's cork screw,
whether they are part of a line of products or not. Would it cover a
duck-shaped bottle opener? Or a plastic duck-shaped bottle opener, if
the original one was made of metal? Conceivably, each of these
items could be confusing to the consumer and therefore qualify for
trade dress protection. If allowed, such protection would expand
exponentially and take a huge territory away from competitors.
77. Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1997).
78. Walt Disney Co. v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp, 830 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. N.Y.
1993).
79. Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d. 25 (1st Cir. 2001).
80. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
81. Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co., Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9879 (S.D. N.Y.
2001).
82. Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. N.Y. 1992).
83. Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1256 (9th Cir. 2001).
84. Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2001).
85. Landscape, 113 F.3d at 380 ("Courts have exercised particular caution when
extending protection to product designs.. .denying protection that would hamper competition").
86. Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1999);
Yurman Design v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 117 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[F]or obvious reasons, concern
for protecting competition is in that context [protection for an entire line of products]
particularly acute. A claim of trade dress covering an array of items is likely to be broader than
one for an individual product's design").
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3. Protection Options for Product Design
Trade dress is not the only option available for protection of the
"type of look," design patent and copyright could also qualify.
Design patents, which are granted to articles of manufacture that meet
the requirements of being original, novel and ornamental, 8 have been
on the increase in recent years.8 9
Many rights owners, however, are reluctant to rely on design
patent protection because of the lengthy and costly process of
prosecuting the application and obtaining the right.90 Consequently,
because neither copyrights nor trademarks necessarily require
advance registration, 9' claims are often brought, strategically, under
both theories, regardless of whether they in fact apply.92
Copyright extends to "type of look" claims only under certain
very limited circumstances. A "useful article" covers most product
design, but is limited to a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work,93 and
only if the design can be separated from the utilitarian aspects of the
article.94 So long as the utilitarian aspect is physically separable95
from the ornamental aspect, the test is easy to apply.
87. "Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title." 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1999). See also Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d
234, 238 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that if a patented design is primarily functional rather than
ornamental, the patent is invalid). "Copyright subsists... in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression..."17 U.S.C. 102(a).
88. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 & 171 (1999).
89. James Hamilton, Philippe Signore & Christopher Ward, An Underdog That Bites,
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Nov. 2002 ("An increase in design patents has been
registered, from less than 200 in 1991 to more than 1100 in 2001").
90. Design patents are subject to the conditions and requirements governing utility
patents. 35 U.S.C.S. § 171 (1999) ("The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions
shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided").
91. Federal copyright protection attaches at the moment of creation of any work within
the scope of the statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). See also Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am. 847 F.2d
412,415 (7th Cir. 1988). Trademarks arise out of use. See Int'l Caf6, SA.L. v. Hard Rock Cafd
Int'l, Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1279 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
92. Asserting both claims, gives them a better chance of prevailing on at least one theory.
In effect the result of this strategy is that courts often have a hard time in the analytical
separation of the two types of claims. See also Helfand, supra note 45 at 641. Favorable ruling
on one count allows finding of infringement on others, especially since plaintiffs allege every
conceivable theory of protection. Prevailing on one gives right to injunction, which in many
instances is tantamount to winning the case.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003).
94. See id
95. Mazerv. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
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When physical separation is not possible because the two aspects
are closely intertwined, "conceptual separablity" is required.96
Numerous tests have been advanced to achieve conceptual
separablity, including the "primary-subsidiary" test, 97  the
"inextricably intertwined" test,98 the "temporal displacement" test, 99
and the Denicola/Brandir artistic judgment test.'00  Neither their
names nor their number inspire confidence in the simplicity of the
analysis or the predictability of the outcome, and many rights holders
have been deterred from relying on copyright for protection.
0 1
4. "Type of Look" Under the Lanham Act
This leaves the Lanham Act as the doctrine of choice for rights
holders. Although its current version covers the categories of "word,
name, symbol or device, ' ' 1°2 much of the Lanham Act grew out of
common law trademark law and was originally intended for word
marks. Gradually, protection extended to logos and symbols capable
of carrying meaning and thereby identifying a product's source.,
°3
The doctrine was further expanded to include labels, wrappers, and
containers used in packaging, including three dimensionally shaped
packaging. Three dimensional design of products independent of
packaging took protection one step farther.10 4  Trade dress is a
relatively recent creation, not much more than 20 years old. It is
defined as "the total image of a product [that] may include features
such as size, shape, color or color combination, texture, graphics or
96. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)
(articulating the concept of "conceptual separability" of utilitarian from ornamental aspects of
the work and granting protection to decorated belt buckle). After Kieselstein the courts have
struggled with the concept.
97. Id. at 993 (If the primary ornamental aspect is conceptually separable from the
subsidiary utilitarian function, the item is protectable).
98. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
if aesthetic and artistic features are inextricably intertwined, copyright protection will be
denied).
99. Id. at 422-23 (dissenting opinion by Judge Newman) (explaining that if the ordinary
observer can focus on the non-utilitarian aspect alone, protection may be granted).
100. Brandir Int'l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987). This
test proposes a sliding scale between art and utility, the more the work is influenced by
utilitarian considerations, the less it can be copyrighted.
101. See generally, Richard Frenkel, Intellectual Property in the Balance: Proposals for
Improving Industrial Design Protection in the Post-TRIPS Era, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 531,
547-50 (1999).
102. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1996).
103. I.P. Lund Trading ApS & Kroin, Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 1998).
104. MCCARTHY, supra note 48 at § 8: 1.
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even particular color techniques."'' 0 5 In other words, "the design and
appearance of a product together with the elements making up the
overall image that serves to identify the product presented to the
consumer."' 1 6 In 1999 Subsection 43(a)(3) of the Lanham Act was
amended to protect unregistered trade dress. 1
07
"Type of Look" rights holders prefer trade dress protection
because the requirements for protectability are relatively simple. All
that needs to be shown is that the product is distinctive and non-
functional. 108
As applied to product design, trade dress is still a very young and
developing doctrine with which courts are still ill at ease. 109 Because
the trade dress doctrine borders closely on both copyright and design
patents, legitimate concern exists that over-extensions of trade dress
protection will thwart policy rationales of copyright and trademark
law, and negatively affect competition." 10
In an effort to stem the flow of product design cases brought
under a trade dress theory, over the last three years the Supreme Court
has restated the standards for both distinctiveness"' and non-
functionality," 12 the two defining elements of trade dress. The Court's
expectation was that the decisions would reduce the frequency and
difficulty of such cases. This did not occur. As one commentator
points out, more than two years after these decisions "butchers, bakers
105. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11 th Cir. 1983).
106. Chrysler Corp. v. John C. Silva, Jr., 118 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Fun-
Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 999 (2d Cir. 1997)).
107. Subsection 43(a)(3) of the Lanham Act, added in 1999, refers to "civil actions for
trade dress infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal
register." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) extends protection not only to words and symbols, but also to
"trade dress."
108. See Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2001).
109. In the course of the past three years the Supreme Court has redefined both of the
elements of the trade dress doctrine. See Traffix Devices v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S.
23 (2001); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2000).
110. Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Overextension of trade dress protection can undermine restrictions in copyright and patent law
that are designed to avoid monopolization of products and ideas").
111. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2000) (holding
that trade dress involving product design or configuration cannot be inherently distinctive, and
therefore always requires proof of secondary meaning).
112. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) ("Discussing
trademarks, we have said 'in general terms, a product feature is functional,' and cannot serve as
a trademark, 'if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality
of the article"').
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and candlestick makers, waving trade dress claims, still line the
courthouse steps."
' ' 13
Can trade dress, a doctrine that itself is still in flux, expand to
include protection for the "type of look"?
"TYPE OF LOOK" IN CASE LAW
The overriding theme present throughout "type of look" cases is
the need to ensure that the proper balance between free competition
and protection is observed.' 1 4 This interest dictates denial of trade
dress rights on two grounds. The first, functionality, acts as a bar to
features that (1) are essential to the use or purpose of the article, and
(2) affect its cost or quality.'1 5 The second, non-distinctiveness,
results from the failure to articulate the claimed design features with
sufficient precision and their consequent inability to act as an
indicator of source." 6 Functionality is present mostly in its aesthetic
functionality variety, 1 7 which is germane to design protection
because of the visual aesthetic element involved. However,
distinctiveness has proven to be the true stumbling block with respect
to design protection, since, as the following discussion points out,
design, for the most part, is simply not "distinctive" in a trademark
sense.
113. See Defining Trade Dress After Wal-Mart v. Samara Brothers, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 4,
2002 at 20. In Vasquez v. Ybarra, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Kansas 2001), the owners of a
Mexican restaurant sued the owners of a competing restaurant for trade dress infringement,
alleging the overall look of the restaurant's menu was trade dress. The court found that the
overall visual appearance of a menu is a tertium quid similar to the restaurant layout in Two
Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763 (1992), which allowed the plaintiff to argue the menu is
inherently distinctive. In Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2001),
as in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, Clicks sought to protect its trade dress in the overall layout of
its pool halls, on the ground that the combination of elements created a "distinctive visual
impression." Clicks made a strategic decision to try to establish secondary meaning, and the
Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that an issue of fact
had been raised concerning secondary meaning.
114. Yurman Design, 262 F.3d at 115 ("[T]rade dress claims raise a potent risk that relief
will impermissibly afford a level of 'protection that would hamper efforts to market competitive
goods' (quoting Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 380 (2d Cir.
1997)).
115. See Traffix Devices, 532 U.S. at 23 (2001).
116. Yurman Design, 262 F.3d at 115.
117. Commentators have pushed for a more robust use of the doctrine, to maintain design
within bounds. See Denicola, supra note 7, at 1670-71.
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1. The "Line of Product" Cases
The most often cited case relating to protection for an entire line
of products is Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade
Company.118  In Landscape, plaintiff sought protection for its
"Petoskey" line of outdoor furniture, which featured three inch curved
metal tubing that gives the viewer a floating feeling. To satisfy the
distinctiveness requirement, a plaintiff must provide a "precise
expression of the character and scope" of the claimed trade dress."
19
The court felt plaintiffs description of the product was too abstract
and denied protection to the design. 20  At the same time the court
opened the door to similar claims: "there is no question that trade
dress may protect the "overall look."' 2 1 Other cases followed shortly
thereafter.
Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co.,12 2 involved a set
of labels used for different candle fragrances. The labels graphically
depicted the fragrance of the particular candle by showing the
associated fruit or flower. The court emphasized that a claim to
protect a series or line of products must show that the appearance of
the several products is sufficiently distinct and unique to merit
protection. The elements presented by plaintiff were not so "unique
and unusual" as to be source indicative in the absence of secondary
meaning. 1
23
In Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc.,124 the court denied a trade
dress claim for a line of jewelry, because, in that case, the plaintiff
had not articulated the elements of the trade dress sufficiently to be a
protectable, source-identifying expression."' 5 However, the Second
Circuit made a point of emphasizing that, in general, "a Plaintiff such
as Yurman may seek trade dress protection for an entire product line,
118. 113 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1997).
119. Landscape, 113 F.3d at 381. The elements of the trade dress claimed by Landscape
were "large three-inch tubing, with a powdered cosmetic finish, bent in gentle turns that roll
around the perimeter of the furniture which in combination with the various seating surfaces
gives the viewer a floating or suspended feetling. Id.
120. The court found that the features listed by Landscape were not enough to be "likely to
be perceived by consumers as bearing the stamp of their maker." Accordingly, the design did
not qualify for trade dress protection because it was not likely to serve as primary source
indicator and granting trade dress protection to an ordinary product design would create
monopoly in the goods themselves. Id. at 381.
121. Id.
122. 259 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001).
123. Id. at 43.
124. 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2001).
125. Id. at 117.
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by establishing that the "overall look" in each separate product is
consistent,"' 126 i.e. that there is no legal obstacle to the assertion of
such claims.
Predictably, some cases resulted in "type of look" claims being
upheld.
In Wal-Mart v. Samara Bros., plaintiff ("Samara Bros.")
designed and manufactured a line of children's clothing with
decorative appliques. Based on photographs of the Samara Bros.
clothing, Defendant ("Wal-Mart") contracted to have knock-offs
manufactured and offered them for sale. Samara Bros. sued for trade
dress infringement. 127
The Second Circuit upheld the jury verdict in favor of Samara
Bros. Samara Bros.' description of the appliques was a "distinctive
combination of ingredients" which sufficiently depicts the "Samara
type of look.'' 128 Although the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit opinion,129 it left intact the possibility that trade dress could
be used to protect a "type of look," provided that secondary meaning
is shown. If on remand in Wal-Mart the Plaintiff had proven
secondary meaning, 130 the Supreme Court decision would not have
precluded the Second Circuit's ruling.
Coach v. We Care Trading Co.13 1 involves the sale of imitation
Coach leather bags. Coach identified four trade dress elements, at a
fairly high level of generality.' 32  Defendant ("We Care") is in the
126. Id. at 116. The Second Circuit made a similar statement in Landscape four years
earlier. In the interim it decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., in which it found
the plaintiff's "type of look" protected. Although the facts in Yurman did not warrant
protection, the court even in the wake of Wal-Mart, is clearly sending the message that "type of
look" is protectable.
127. Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1998).
128. The specific design elements claimed by Samara included: "seersucker fabric; large
bold appliques; large collars with the appliques generally integrated into the collar and any
pockets on the garment; general absence of printed images, black outlines, alphanumeric
characters, three-dimensional features or heavy ornamentation (such as bibs or fringe) which are
frequently used in children's clothing; and full-cut, one-piece conservative bodies." Id. at 126-
27.
129. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2000) (holding
that product design cannot be inherently distinctive, and instead requires proof of secondary
meaning).
130. Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1998)
(upholding the Second Circuit decision that Samara's trade dress was inherently distinctive).
131. Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9879 (S.D. N.Y. 2001),
aff'd in part, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13568 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1108 (2003).
132. The elements of the trade dress claimed by Coach: "glove-tanned leather, bound
edges, brass or nickel-plated brass hardware, and a lozenge-shaped hangtag with a beaded
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business of distributing imitation handbags. Its owners travel to Asia
three or four times a year to purchase handbags. The evidence
presented handbags sold by We Care, described as vinyl handbags
made to simulate leather, bound edges, simulated brass hardware, and
a Coach look-alike blank hangtag. A video of We Care's premises
showed two rooms packed with imitation handbags, belts and
hangtags. 
33
On these facts, the court upheld Coach's trade dress claim.
Secondary meaning was found based on a survey, in which a majority
of the women questioned recognized the bags as Coach bags. The
court held the designs to be non-functional because numerous other
ways of making handbags exist, and, consequently, the trade dress
granted would not hinder competition. 134  The Second Circuit
affirmed in part. 13 The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 136
2. The Style Cases
Although the "style" cases do not arise in the context of
utilitarian articles, as in the "type of look" cases, they do seek to
establish protection beyond a single product into an entire line,
claiming protection for style or type of look of an artist's creation. As
in utilitarian design, the first attempts were unsuccessful.
In Hughes v. Design Look, Inc.,' 37 defendant produced calendars
featuring uncopyrighted images by Andy Warhol. 138 The estate of
Andy Warhol claimed protection for the artist's unique style because
the images at issue-Marilyns and Campbell's Soup-have come to
represent Warhol. The court rejected the claim because the applicable
test is not whether the images must come to signify Andy Warhol as
the artist, but rather whether the plaintiffs are the source of the
product, in this case, the calendars.1 39 A similar effort to claim a
trademark for the "particular lines, unique figural constellation,
chain". These are being used on handbags, luggage and a variety of other bags and luggage
items. Coach, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9878 at 3.
133. Id. at 8 and 13.
134. Id. at 13.
135. Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13568 (2d Cir. 2002).
136. We Care Trading Co. v. Coach, Inc., 537 U.S. 1108 (2003).
137. 693 F. Supp. 1500 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
138. Id. at 1507 (noting that there was no doubt that these works were created by Warhol).
139. Id. at 1500 and 1507 (citing Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp.
1191 (S.D. N.Y. 1979)). The presence of an underlying separable product allows the court to
avoid the true issue of whether the "type of look" deserves protection.
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colors, stylistic features and design" 140 of Salvador Dali was rejected
in Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro.14 1 The court noted that the
plaintiff used the mechanism of trademark protection to enforce, what
is at best, a copyright claim.1
42
Eventually however, the efforts to protect an artist's visual style
proved successful. As in Galerie Furstenberg and Hughes, plaintiffs
in Romm Art v. Simcha,143 sought protection for the visual style of a
well known poster artist. The plaintiffs ("Romm Art") were the
exclusive licensees of the internationally renowned poster artist Itzak
Tarkay. Defendants ("Simcha") sold a series of works called the
Patricia line of posters, 144 alleged by Plaintiffs to be slavishly similar
and entirely derived from the Tarkay posters. The only claims alleged
were trademark and unfair competition. 14  No copyright claim was
made.
Visual art is properly protected under copyright, not the Lanham
Act. 146  In absence of a copyright claim the court indulged the
plaintiffs' unfair competition claims, but in doing so, used trademark
and copyright concepts indiscriminately. The analysis was
conclusory: because the posters presented a "distinctive visual
impression," 147 secondary meaning was present and the posters were
deemed not functional. 148 Protection was granted.
The opinion contains a number of misconceptions. First, the
court mistakenly attributes the incentives of copyright law to the
Lanham Act. "One salutary purpose of the Lanham Act in this
context is to protect a creative artist's rights in his or her creation and
thus provide incentive to be creative."' 149 In fact it is not the purpose
140. Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1289 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
141. Id. at 1282.
142. Id. at 1290.
143. Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc.,786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. N.Y. 1992).
144. Id. at 1131.
145. The claims alleged were violation of(l) plaintiff's trade dress under the Lanham Act;
(2) dilution under the New York statute and (3) unfair competition under the New York statute.
Id.
146. Galerie Furstenberg, 697 F. Supp. at 1290.
147. Romm Art, 786 F. Supp. at 1136.
148. Plaintiffs alleged that the combination of visual features of the Tarkay posters created
a distinctive visual impression that is not functional and therefore protectable under 43(a). Id.
149. Romm Art, 786 F. Supp. at 1135 (citing Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
647 F. Supp. 1533, 1540 (D.C. Colo. 1986)) ("one salutary purpose of the Lanham Act in this
context is to protect a creative artists' rights in his or her creation and thus provide incentive to
be creative. By protecting and fostering creativity, a product with features different and perhaps
preferable to the ... product [at issue] may well be developed. Offering consumers a choice in
the non-occasion greeting card market stimulates, rather than stifles competition").
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of unfair competition law, in the guise of consumer protection, to
implement a policy of encouraging innovative designs by protecting
them once designed. 50  This misconception of policy results in an
outcome that crosses the doctrinal dividing lines.
Further, the court mistakes the posters' visual uniqueness and the
artist's fame for indicators of source.151 Plaintiffs presented testimony
that Tarkay is considered one of two of the best selling artists in the
world wide poster market.'52 Without any further evidence, the court
concluded that "other than aesthetic gratification these images serve
no other purpose than to identify their source/creator,"' 5 3 and
therefore the Tarkay mark is a stong mark which meets "the criteria
for an arbitrary or fanciful mark because it identifies the origin of the
item. ,
54
Finally, the court equates the artist with the source. This is not
acceptable under trademark law because the identity of the artist is
irrelevant for purposes of designation of origin under trademark
law. 55  The proper test, as stated in Hughes v. Design Look, is
whether the image has come to signify the source of the product, not
whether it signifies the artist. 156  Unlike Hughes where the images
were placed on calendars, here the image and product are merged.
The absence of an underlying product makes the analysis more
difficult. The court eschewed this issue by simply equating the artist
with the source as the "source/creator,"' 157 a solution that may not be
correct under current trademark law,' 58 but that may be evolving into
acceptability.
159
Interestingly, the court relied on the district court decision in Hartford, which was subsequently
clarified on appeal to show that "artistic style alone cannot receive trade dress protection. Id.
150. EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 64
(2d Cir. 2000).
151. The combination of visual features of the Tarkay posters created a distinctive visual
impression that is not functional and therefore protectable under 43(a). Romm Art, 786 F. Supp.
at 1136.
152. Id. at 1137.
153. Id. at 1136.
154. Id.
155. MCCARTHY, supra note 48 at § 3.0211] ("The identity of the designer or artist who
created the image is irrelevant unless that person is identified as the source of the product or
service sold under the trademark image").
156. Hughes v. Design Look, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
157. Romm Art, 786 F. Supp. at 1137.
158. See MCCARTHY, supra note 48 at § 3.02[2].
159. See ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 61
(Duke University Press 1998).
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The outcome of this case is troublesome. In the guise of trade
dress/unfair competition protection, plaintiffs are granted broader
rights than they would be entitled to under a copyright analysis.
Copyright law only protects expressive elements. 60  Here, the
claimed elements are articulated at a very high level of abstraction,
and would probably be unprotectable under copyright law: two
female figures with hats and patterned dresses, a particular
background color and flora.' 61 The result is that any poster depicting
two women with hats and patterned dresses etc. could give rise to
likelihood of confusion.
Furthermore, the scope of protection is considerably broader
under trade dress law. While under copyright law the artist would
have the right to preclude copying' 62 of work created by the artist,
here plaintiff was granted the potential right to preclude distribution
of posters created by third parties. The result is the effective removal
of the elements listed above from the public domain potentially
perpetually and without the softening effect of the "fair use" doctrine.
The Romm Art decision was widely criticized as going too far.
As one court aptly characterized this outcome, "If the law protected
style at.. .a [high] level of abstraction, Bracque might have prevented
Picasso from selling cubist paintings., 63 Nonetheless, the decision
remains on the books and, given the pressure to protect in the area of
visual style and "type of look," will undoubtedly be followed one day.
3. The Music Cases
A subset of the "style" cases illustrates how rapidly trade dress
law evolves to accept new forms of IP. It is well established that
music has the capacity to act as a source identifier when associated
with a particular product.' 64 Here however, protection is sought not
for the music's ability to indicate a source, but to point to the artist
herself. In that regard the protection is not unlike the protection for
160. Jack Leigh v. Warner Bros., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1382 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (Such a
monopoly over ideas or themes was not contemplated by the copyright law).
161. Romm Art, 786 F. Supp. at 1138 ("The use of two figures, the hats by the women [sic]
the patterned dresses, the background colors and the appearance of flora").
162. As well as creation of derivative works, public display and distribution.
163. Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 382 (2d Cir. 1997).
164. There are many examples of such music marks, including "William Tell Overture for
the Lone Ranger" (see Registration No. 2155923), "Sweet Georgia Brown" for the Harlem
Globetrotters (see Registration No. 1700895). Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 62 n.l
(2d Cir. 2001).
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style sought in Romm Art. In EMI Catalogue Partnership v. Hill,
65
the Second Circuit categorically refused to expand the definition of
trademark so far as to grant a song the status of trademark. 66 The
case involved Benny Goodman's song entitled "Sing, Sing, Sing
(With a Swing)," an alliterative version of which (Swing, Swing,
Swing) had been used in a commercial for golf clubs. The Second
Circuit refused to enjoin this use on a Lanham Act theory because the
claimed trademark in the song was coextensive with the music itself,
and therefore not appropriate for trademark protection. 1
67
Only one year later however, the Second Circuit indicated that it
would not be "unthinkable for the trademark law to accord the
performing artist a trademark or service mark in her signature
performance."' 168  Indeed, the court noted that a number of reasons
exist for Congress to extend such protection to artists.1 69  Oliveira
involved a claim for trade dress protection in performing artist Astrud
Oliveira's 1964 recording of "The Girl from Ipanema." Oliveira
presented evidence that not only is the song her signature piece, but it
is the centerpiece of all her concert appearances. Moreover, the
public associates the performance of Ipanema with her, and she bills
herself as "The Girl from Ipanema."'' 70  The court denied the claim
apparently not for policy but for practical reasons, to prevent existing
licensees from having to request an additional trademark license on a
song for which they have already purchased conventional use
licenses. '
71
165. EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, Inc., 228 F.3d 56 (2d
Cir. 2000).
166. Id. at 63 (Trademark law "does not protect the content of a creative work or artistic
expression as a trademark for itself").
167. Id. at 64 ("The work itself is protected from misappropriation by the copyright laws
and the source-identifying function of trademarks requires that a trademark in a musical
composition not be coextensive with the music itself. Rather, the trademark serves to identify
the copyrighted music").
168. Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62.
169. Id. at 62-63 (indicating that there are reasons both for and against such extension of
protection).
170. Id. at 61.
171. Id. at 63.
But for a court now to 'recognize' the previously unknown existence of such a
right would be profoundly disruptive to commerce. Numerous artists who could
assert claims similar to Gilberto's would bring suit against entities that had paid
bona fide license fees to all known holders of rights. Indeed, artists who had
licensed users under their copyrights and had received fees for the copyright
license could bring suits claiming additional compensation for infringement of
trademark rights. Immense unforeseen liabilities might accrue, upsetting
reasonable commercial expectations.
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However, the door to such claims remains wide open. So far, no
reported decision has taken this concept a step further, but the
attempts continue. 172 As in visual art, if this doctrine is pushed to its
logical extreme, signature recordings of contemporary performers
could be removed from the public domain well beyond expiration of
their copyright.
The style and music cases are similar to design cases in that they
seek to protect creations through a line of products in a commercial
context. Both types of cases in principle qualify for dual protection
under trademark and copyright law. For style cases, copyright
protection may be a solution because they do not have to face the
conceptual separability hurdle. Clearly, none of the lines of cases
discussed above is a natural fit for a trademark analysis.
Part III
WHY COURTS ARE HAVING TROUBLE WITH PRODUCT DESIGN AND
THE LANHAM ACT
The two defining elements of the trade dress doctrine are non-
functionality and distinctiveness. 73  Both of these elements have
undergone fundamental reshaping in the course of the past three
years. 174 Failure to meet either of these elements will lead to denial of
a trade dress claim. If properly applied, these limitations could help
reign in the "doctrinal creep" of trade dress law. This section will
discuss how each of these concepts is applied in the context of
product design.
FUNCTIONALITY
Functionality serves to promote competition by "encouraging...
the broadest dissemination of useful design features" and by
"protecting advances in functional design from being
Id
172. See G.M.L., Inc. v. Mayhew, 188 F. Supp. 2d 891, 896-97 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). The
plaintiff claimed that Johnny Paycheck Little Darlin masters recording had gained secondary
meaning as the work of performing artist Johnny Paycheck. The court declined the claim. Id.
173. Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2001).
174. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (dealing with
the distinctiveness requirement); Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23
(2001) (dealing with the functionality requirement).
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monopolized." 175 Trade dress law denies protection to features which
are functional, i.e. features (1) that are essential to the use or purpose
of the article, and (2) that affect its cost or quality. 176  Thus a
successful trade dress claim must show that the feature is non-
functional. The non-functionality element is present in all bodies of
law that protect product design. 177 It reflects the policy that exclusive
rights to functional features may be regulated only by (utility) patent
law. 178
Aesthetic functionality is an extension of utilitarian functionality
and is based on the same type of analysis: an inquiry into the
availability of adequate alternative designs. 179  If the range of
alternative designs is limited by the nature of the article's aesthetic
appeal,180 or, otherwise stated, if the aesthetics of the design is such as
to foreclose alternative designs,181 protection will be denied. If it can
be shown that the design choices for which protection is sought were
the only ones that could create the proper aesthetic appeal for the
article, if no other design choice would do, protection may be granted.
Aesthetic functionality is particularly germane to "type of look,"
175. Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 605 (S.D. N.Y 1996).
176. Traffix Devices, 532 U.S. at 33.
177. Keystone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 1450 (Fed. Cir.
1993). Only the non-functional aspects of an ornamental design are proper bases for design
patent protection. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 992 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1980).
178. Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Patent law, not
trade dress law, is the principal means for providing exclusive rights in useful product
features").
179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, cmt. c, ("a finding of
aesthetic functionality ordinarily will be made only when objective evidence indicates a lack of
adequate alternative designs").
180. The Restatement explains:
A design is functional because of its aesthetic value only if it confers a significant
benefit that cannot be practically duplicated by the use of alternative designs.
Because of the difficulties inherent in evaluating the aesthetic superiority of a
particular design, a finding of aesthetic functionality ordinarily will be made only
when objective evidence indicates a lack of adequate alternative designs. Such
evidence typically is available only when the range of alternative designs is
limited either by the nature of the design feature or by the basis of its aesthetic
appeal. The ultimate test of aesthetic functionality, as with utilitarian
functionality, is whether the recognition of trademark rights would significantly
hinder competition. (Emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, cmt. c. See also Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995); Krueger International, 915 F. Supp. at 606;
MCCARTHY, supra note 48 at § 7.26[3][e].
181. Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 80-81 (2d
Cir. 1990). See also Krueger International, 915 F. Supp. at 606.
2004] PROTECTING THE FORM BUT NOT THE FUNCTION 557
because product design is primarily focused on visual differentiation
of articles. 182
Aesthetic functionality is deemed to be one of the least well
understood concepts in IP law. 183 Courts have engaged in a "hopeless
tangle about the difference between aesthetics and functionality."'184
Some commentators have called for a more robust use of this
doctrine, 85 because it has the potential of serving as a useful tool in
keeping design protection within more reasonable bounds,' 86 and also
to prevent copyrightable features from receiving more protection
under trade dress law than they would have received under copyright
law. 18
7
In Wallace International v. Godinger, for example, the Second
Circuit proposes a test for application of the aesthetic functionality
doctrine that limits protection to "precise expression of a decorative
style," and denies protection to "basic elements of style that are part
of the public domain." 188 A notable aspect of this test is that it rings
very close to the idea-expression analysis utilized in copyright law. 1
89
However, its practical application is far from clear (as is the copyright
idea-expression analysis1 90) and is likely to be applied on an "I know
it when I see it" basis.' 91
Application of the aesthetic functionality doctrine in the Romm
Art case could have led to a different result. The Wallace test applied
to the Romm Art facts would exclude basic elements of style and
182. Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to
Copyright in UsefulArticles, 67 MINN. L. REv. 707, 739 (1983).
183. See Mitchell M. Wong, The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine and the Law of Trade-
Dress Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1160 (1998).
184. Krueger International, 915 F. Supp. at 606.
185. Denicola, supra note 7, at 1670.
186. Id.
187. See Wong, supra note 183, at 1160. The doctrine has been criticized for denying
"trade dress protection to design features whose only sin it was to delight the senses." See also
Krueger International, 915 F. Supp. at 606.
188. Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir.
1990).
189. 17 U.S.C.S. § 102 n 4 (Law. Co-op. 2003) (Copyright protects expression but not
ideas).
190. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D. Mass. 1990)
(Referring to Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), "Hand offered us no formula for distinguishing between idea and
expression"). See also Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32, 35 (S.D. N.Y. 1977) ("[Tihe distinction
between an 'idea' and 'expression of an idea' is necessarily vague").
191. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (concurring opinion) ("I know it when I see
it," as in Justice Stewart's definition of'hard-core pornography).
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protect as trade dress only the artist's precise expression. The extent
to which Tarkay posters incorporate "basic elements of style"
depends on what the trier of fact perceives, and application of the test
without further guidelines may be difficult. However, at least in
principle, application of the quasi-copyright analysis formulated in
Wallace would have resulted in protection closer to what plaintiffs
would be entitled to under copyright analysis. 192
On the other hand, the aesthetic functionality doctrine has its
critics as well. Professor McCarthy very bluntly states that there is no
need for this theory. 193 A closer look at the relationship between
aesthetic functionality and the other defining element of trade dress
confirms this conclusion. The Wallace aesthetic functionality test
limits protection to the "precise expression of decorative style.' 94
The Landscape distinctiveness test limits protection to "precise
expression of the character of the claimed trade dress."' 95 Evidently,
these are, as applied, one and the same test, which follow different
analytical avenues. The Wallace test is intended to protect against
monopolies based on aesthetic appeal, while the Landscape test is
meant to ensure the presence of appropriate source indication.
However, the underlying concern is the same-to avoid a negative
impact on free competition. This fact would suggest that one of the
tests is redundant.
DISTINCTIVENESS
"Type of look" product design cases present courts with several
challenges with respect to distinctiveness.
1. The Double Entendre of Distinctiveness
The legal term "distinctiveness"'' 96 is easily confused with the
concept of striking visual appearance. Courts have used the term
192. Application of the Wallace analysis would only resolve the impermissible protection
of ideas. Other aspects of trade dress protection such as the indefinite duration and the inability
to assert copyright fair use would remain in effect; of course, if the article truly functions as a
source identifier and deserves trade dress protection, the latter aspects are not troublesome.
193. MCCARTHY, supra note 48 at 7:26[5] ("Trademark law and policy does not need the
theory of 'aesthetic functionality').
194. Wallace, 916 F.2d at 81.
195. Landscape, 113 F.3d at 381.
196. Distinctiveness refers to the capability of symbols to identify the source of the goods
that bear the symbol and to distinguish them from goods of others. If a symbol is incapable of
being distinctive, because it is descriptive or otherwise, it cannot function as a trademark or
trade dress. See McCARTHY, supra note 48 at §§ 3:1-3:2.
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"distinctiveness" indiscriminately, both in its ordinary meaning as
different, striking, unusual, or eccentric,' 97 and as a legal term of art to
show source indicative capacity.' 98 This dual use poses the risk that a
subjective impression in response to the quality of the design is
substituted for proof of association with a source. 99 As pointed out
above, the court in Romm Art confused the unique look and the
popularity of Tarkay the artist 20 0 with the Tarkay look as a product
201
source designator. Similarly, in Yankee Candle, the court implies
that a greater quantum of uniqueness will make the trade dress source
indicative, i.e distinctive, again substituting the visual appearance for
the legal standard.20 2  As long as no distinguishing terminology
differentiates between aesthetic distinctiveness (striking appearance)
and legal distinctiveness (source indicative capability) these two
concepts risk being confused.
2. "Precise Expression" Of Design Elements
To prevail in a "type of look" claim, a plaintiff must articulate "a
precise expression of the character and scope of the claimed trade
197. Denicola, supra note 7 at 1673 (citing Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An
Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1374 (1987)).
198. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F .2d 1042, 1051 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (concurring opinion by
Judge Nies) ("distinctiveness as an indication of origin, not simply that it is a distinctive design
in the sense of being unusual").
199. Denicola, supra note 7, at 1673 (citing Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An
Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1374 (1987)). See also Leigh v. Time Warner Entertainment
Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1382 (S.D. Ga. 1998). The Romm Art court "confused the popularity
of Tarkay the artist with the use of the Tarkay look as a product source designator. In such
cases the visual impact of the appearance is substituted for proof of association with a source
that shows real secondary meaning." Similarly, "here the competitive interest in copying is
greater (and the likelihood of actual source association seems smaller) than for labels and
packaging, and [...] the freedom to copy should give way only in the face of proven source
significance." Denicola, supra note 7 at 1673 (citing Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An
Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1374 (1987)).
200. In both the style and the music cases, efforts are made to recognize the author as the
"source." Traditional trademark law rejects that notion. However, the question arises whether
the concept of source is undergoing a change. After all, the concept of source in trademark law
has undergone fundamental changes in moving from a physical source of goods to a "single
albeit anonymous source," adjusting to modem means of doing business. Lanham Act § 43, 15
U.S.C. 1127 (2001). MCCARTHY, supra note 48 at §§ 3:03[l] and 3:04[1]. If all indications
point to the creator as source and if the public associates the work with the creator, it could
arguably be a sufficient source indication to warrant trademark protection. See also ROSEMARY
COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 61 (Duke University Press
1998).
201. See Leigh v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1382 (S.D. Ga.
1998) (the Tarkay court "confused the popularity of Tarkay the artist with the use of the Tarkay
look as a product source designator").
202. Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2001).
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dress. 2 °3 A precise expression is important. It allows the courts to
(1) evaluate how unique and unexpected the design elements are in
the relevant market; (2) tailor narrow relief; and (3) most
significantly, to determine if the claim is pitched too broadly, i.e., if it
seeks protection for an overly general and therefore unprotectable
style, theme or idea.20 4 However, no court has defined how precise
the "precise expression" of the elements must be. This complete
absence of standards leads to unprincipled results, as illustrated by the
divergent outcomes in the "line of product" cases. The following
chart compares the description of the claimed trade dress in two
cases: Landscape°5 and Coach.2 °6
Landscape Coach
Elements of claimed trade dress: Elements of claimed trade
"large three-inch tubing, with a dress: "glove-tanned leather,
powdered cosmetic finish, bent in bound edges, brass or nickel-
gentle turns that roll around the plated brass hardware, and a
perimeter of the furniture which in lozenge-shaped hangtag with a
combination with the various seating beaded chain".
surfaces gives the viewer a floating
or suspended feeling"
20 7
Holding: no trade dress protection Holding: trade dress granted for
type of look
Special circumstances: none Special circumstances: strong
evidence of reprehensible conduct
In Landscape, the plaintiff gave a detailed description of the
claimed trade dress, yet the court refused to grant protection because
the level of specificity did not meet the three criteria stated above.
20 8
Compared to Landscape, the design described in Coach is
considerably more abstract. In fact, it is so abstract that it describes
more than half of the handbags on the market. The description
provided by Coach is certainly not precise enough to allow a court to
evaluate its uniqueness or to tailor a narrow relief, as required by
Landscape. Nonetheless, the Coach court found in favor of the
plaintiff.
203. Landscape Form, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 380 (2d Cir. 1997).
(Emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 373.
206. Coach, Inc. v. We Care Trading Co, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9879 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).
207. Landscape, 113 F.3d at 381.
208. Id.
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Absent guidance on the required level of precision, courts can all
too easily be swayed by considerations extraneous to the elements
required to prove the case. In Coach, the court was likely influenced
by evidence of the defendant's bad conduct. Wal-Mart also involved
an admitted copyist as defendant, and also resulted in a finding of
trade dress protection for plaintiff.20 9 Although society "looks with
distaste on copiers [because] they reap where they have not sown,",210
copying by defendant does not factor into liability considerations for
trade dress protection purposes. Trade dress law is meant to protect
the consumer, not to punish reprehensible conduct by the defendant.
The fact that these extraneous considerations appear to influence the
trier of fact shows that the absence of standards too easily allows
courts to decide cases based on their sense of fairness or other,
subjective, visceral reactions.
However, this circumstance should not simply be dismissed as a
deficiency of trade dress law. The fact that two courts on similar facts
both considered the defendant's reprehensible conduct poses the
broader question whether or not an equitable resolution of these types
of facts does, in fact mandate consideration of copying.
211
3. "Primarily" Source Indicative
The confusion between aesthetics and source identification in the
"type of look" cases also presents difficulties in the distinctiveness
analysis.
Word marks serve a dual function. On the one hand, they carry
their primary, ordinary meaning.212  On the other, they carry
informational content that identifies and distinguishes the goods as
originating from a particular source, 213 also referred to as secondary
209. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211 (citing Inwood Labs., Inc., v. Lves Labs., Inc., 456
U.S. 844, 851 n.ll (1982)).
210. Brown, supra note 17, at 1386 (Our society "looks with distaste on copiers; [t]hey
reap where they have not sown, they compete unfairly").
211. See infra text accompanying notes 230-232.
212. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211 (Primary meaning would be "apple" as a fruit, or
"Joe's Tasty Bagels" as good bagels).
213. MCCARTHY, supra note 48 at 3.03[2] (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 9, cmt. c.) ("Trademarks serve as means of communication between otherwise
unknown or anonymous producers and their prospective customers"). Examples of secondary or
acquired meaning are e.g. "Apple" as a source of Mac computers or "Joe's Tasty Bagels" as
Joe's baking operation. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1976) (explaining that the strength of marks is categorized in hierarchical order in terms of
whether marks have or support this acquired meaning).
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meaning, or acquired meaning.214 The latter is the basis for protection
under the Lanham Act.
When it comes to product design, the purpose of the design is to
enhance the visual differentiation of a product. Consequently, the
emphasis is on appearance and not on source indicative information.
Consumers are less likely to recognize the design of a product as an
indication of source,2 15 but instead tend to see it as a utilitarian or
ornamental aspect of the goods.2 16
This blurred distinction between aesthetics and source
identification also raises problems with respect to the requirement that
the design be "primarily '217 an indicator of source in order to qualify
for protection. The concept of "primary" source indication is not
helpful in this analysis because it forces courts to determine whether
the consumer chose the product based on its attractiveness, or based
218on the fact that it is an identifier of source. The answer is likely
both. The manufacturer seeks to differentiate its goods by means of an
aesthetically pleasing design2 19 that the consumer begins to associate
with that manufacturer.
This presents courts with difficult decisions, for how can it be
determined where the aesthetic function ends and the source
originating function begins? Regardless of where the line is drawn,
design clearly does not fall into the category of marks whose only
purpose is to serve as source identifier, i.e. marks that can be
inherently distinctive,220 because of the overwhelming importance of
the visual differentiation function. This fact ties directly into the
holding of the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on
distinctiveness of trade dress.
4. No Inherent Distinctiveness
In Wal-Mart v. Samara Bros. 21 , the court differentiated between
214. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211 (pointing out that acquired meaning would be a
more appropriate term).
215. Denicola, supra note 7 at 1674.
216. Id.
217. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1009 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a
design chosen "primarily" for aesthetic reasons is not protectable).
218. Krueger International, 915 F. Supp. at 606; Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 21 1("Non-
word marks ordinarily have no 'primary' meaning").
219. Krueger International, 915 F. Supp. at 606.
220. Inherent distinctiveness refers to marks that have no real purpose other than
associating goods with brands. Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, U.
ILL. L. REV. 887, 888-89, 902 (1988).
221. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
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product packaging and product design in terms of their ability to act
as an indictor of source. Because design is intended not to identify
the source, but instead to render the product more appealing,222
product design was held not to be inherently distinctive.223
As a result of this ruling, proof of secondary meaning is required
to obtain protection for product design and "type of look." 224 The rule
is not new; it used to be the law prior to the Supreme Court's Two
Pesos decision, which held design of a restaurant to be inherently
distinctive.225
The Wal-Mart ruling was prompted by the Court's desire to stem
the doctrinal expansion of the trade dress doctrine.226 This strategy
appears not to have met with much success. Wal-Mart effectively
expands the categories of cognizable trade dress to three:
(1) product configuration that can never be inherently
distinctive, hence secondary meaning is required;
(2) package configuration for which inherent distinctiveness
might exist, and
(3) "tertium quid," a new category of trade dress akin to
packaging, for which inherent distinctiveness might
exist.
22
While the number of product design claims may drop, litigation
will simply shift to whether a given design qualifies as a "tertuim
quid."
On the other hand, this rule seriously limits the ability to protect
product design. Consider the predicament of company A. If company
A launches a product, company B can have imitations of A's design
on the market in a matter of months, while it may take years to
222. Id. at 213.
223. Id. at 215.
224. Id.
225. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
226. See Defining Trade Dress After Wa/-Mart v. Samara Brothers, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 4,
2002. While the Court has effectively limited the ability to obtain trade dress protection for
product design, the battle ground has shifted to whether a product is packaging or a "tertium
quid," akin to packaging both of which can still be inherently distinctive after Wal-Mart.
227. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 215 (suggesting in dictum that restaurant decor, the
subject of Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana might qualify as "either product packaging ... or else
some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging"). Restaurant decor seems to be part of this
category, and decor of a store most likely would too. Reexamining the decision in BestCellars
Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D. N.Y. 1990), which predates the
Supreme Court ruling in Walmart Stores v. Samara Bros., the outcome would likely have been
the same, as a store design seems to fall into the same "tertium quid' category as the Mexican
restaurant in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763 (1992), which can be inherently
distinctive.
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establish secondary meaning.2 28 This circumstance rules out trade
dress protection for many designers, and, because trade dress is the
most utilized and accessible form of protection, this rule also risks
being a disincentive for creative design. The shortcomings of the
Wal-Mart holding suggest that what is needed is an alternate means of
protection for product design.
ARE PRODUCT DESIGN AND TRADE DRESS A MISFIT?
The limitation of trade dress protection effected by the Wal-Mart
holding represent a significant retrenchment from the very broad trade
dress protection previously granted to product design.229 However, its
policy underpinnings cannot be questioned, since they are
presumptively based on the recognition that product design and trade
dress are not a natural fit.
Historically, trade dress developed out of trademark and unfair
competition law. Originally protection was restricted to word marks
and symbols. For purposes of words and symbols, the appearance of
marks is irrelevant. No premium is placed on a particularly pleasing,
new or striking appearance, as long as the mark is an indicator of
origin. When it comes to product design, however, appearance is
critical because pleasing design is its raison d'etre as product
differentiator. Being a source indicator is merely a by-product.
However, trade dress protects only the by-product and not the primary
qualities for which the design was initially created.
Nonetheless product design was assimilated with labels and
packaging and treated the same way, i.e. it was cast into a role where
it had to protect against confusion in the marketplace. 230  This
explains the misfit between product design and the trade dress
doctrine, and why the defining elements of trade dress are
228. This concern was recognized by the Supreme Court in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana:
[A]dding a secondary meaning requirement could have anticompetitive effects,
creating particular burdens on the startup of small companies. It would present
special difficulties for a business, such as respondent, that seeks to start a new
product in a limited area and then expand into new markets. Denying protection
for inherently distinctive nonfunctional trade dress until after secondary meaning
has been established would allow a competitor, which has not adopted a
distinctive trade dress of its own, to appropriate the originator's dress in other
markets and to deter the originator from expanding into and competing in these
areas.
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775.
229. See id.
230. Chrysler Corp. v. John C. Silva, Jr., 118 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Fun-
Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., Il1 F.3d 993, 999 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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uncomfortably stretched to accommodate product design.
This misfit is further reflected in the incongruity between scope
of trade dress protection and the needs of product design. The
remedy company A requires is protection of its design against direct
copying for a limited period of time, i.e. until it has gained a sufficient
head start to recoup its investment and make some profit. Instead,
trade dress protects the consumer from being confused as to the
source of products. The protection granted extends to designs by
third parties that the consumer perceives as similar. It does not,
however, necessarily prevent others from copying A's designs. 31
Furthermore, the protection is for an indefinite duration, granting A a
monopoly for the "type of look" of its design, potentially in
perpetuity. In short, the protection granted is unnecessarily broad for
A's purposes, while A's true needs are not addressed.232
Returning to the example given earlier, trade dress could
conceivably allow the owner of the penguin shaped bar ware design
to block each item in a third party's line of products individually, i.e.
each penguin shaped bottle opener on the market, but also each
penguin shaped corkscrew, and possibly each duck shaped bottle
opener, etc., going on quasi ad infinitum. Such protection is
significantly broader than the rights owner needs to protect against a
large competitor's speedy copying. Furthermore, its impact on
competition is too great to be societally justifiable.
To sort out these concepts, it is helpful to imagine a spectrum of
the source indicative information content of the various categories of
trademarks and trade dress. The spectrum also parallels the
development of the trademark doctrine into trade dress.233
The spectrum lists in descending order of source indicative
content: word marks and symbols, labels and packaging, "tertium
quid" (restaurant ddcor),234 product design and type of look.235 The
231. Depending on whether a likelihood of confusion can be established. More likely, it
will not, because trademark law is aimed at preventing confusion in the marketplace, and not
copying.
232. See Bradley K. Groff, Bare-Fisted Competition or Palming Of0? Protection of
Product Design as Trade Dress under the Lanham Act, 23 AIPLA Q. J. 65, 87 (1995).
Trademark requirements of distinctiveness, non-functionality and likelihood of confusion, are
not adequate to protect against the copying of design which is not otherwise protected by patent
or copyright law.
233. It could be viewed as a variation of the Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc. spectrum applied to trade dress. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d
4 (2d Cir. 1976).
234. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 215.
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"type of look" is listed separately because a broader scope of claims
raises the distinctiveness problems already present in product design




Word Labels and Tertium Product Type of look;
marks and packaging quid- design - style - line of
symbols restaurant single clothes, art,
design product handbags
Three processes are associated with this spectrum, advancing in
the direction of the arrow.
1. The ability to indicate the source weakens. If a design reaches a
point where it loses its source significance entirely, it serves
merely to describe the product itself and no longer receives trade
dress protection;
236
2. the importance of the aesthetic function increases as the source
indicative content decreases, and
3. the potential for competitive harm increases.
As illustrated in the preceding sections, efforts to grant
protection to IP situated at the right end of the spectrum strain both
concepts and policy, and risk an exponential growth of protection,
impinging on innovation and competition. On the other hand, the
protection granted does not meet the rights owner's needs in the
marketplace. The overall benefit is therefore minimal.
The three lines of cases discussed above, "type of look," music,
and visual art, have three elements in common. First, they are
situated to the right end of the trade dress distinctiveness spectrum,
i.e. they carry little or no source indicative information content;
second, they all seek to further expand the Lanham Act; and third,
they should, and with more suitable legal mechanisms could, have
been decided differently. As it stands, trade dress standards are so
indefinite when it comes to product design, that the potential risk to
235. One way to view the "type of look" is that the origin indicative informational content
is replaced with the common elements of design of the line of products, i.e. the information
content is intended to point not to the source, but to the other products in the line.
236. A work cannot serve as a trademark for itself. If it does so it is descriptive of itself
and cannot operate as a trademark. Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62.
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the public domain is unjustifiably great.
The risks and inefficiencies in trying to protect product design
and "type of look" IP by means of trade dress law suggest that at a
given point of the spectrum, tr,-de dress protection should be cut off.
The precise cut-off point is a subject for discussion. A principled
solution would be to preclude trade dress coverage for product design
and "type of look" claims, because these variations of trade dress
claims are defined by their appearance and not by their connection to
the source. The remedies provided by trademark law are of no
particular use to rights holders, and conversely the protection they
need cannot be granted under trademark law. 237 This cut-off point is
consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Wal-Mart, which places
product design into a category distinct from other forms of trade
dress. "Type of look" is simply one step further on the spectrum,
deserving even less protection than product design.238 The necessary
corollary of this cut-off however, is the availability of an alternate
form of protection that addresses the needs of product design.
Part IV
To PROTECT OR NOT TO PROTECT?
If trade dress is not the right vehicle to protect product design,
are there alternatives? Is design a form of IP in need of protection
with nowhere to go? Should it go anywhere? Our society is premised
on the understanding that free competition is the norm.239 Protection
mechanisms are exceptions to the norm justified solely by the pursuit
of a significant policy goal.24° One could argue that company A, by
creating unique designs that differentiate its products from its
competitors, already has a considerable head start in the production of
237. Such cut-off must be correlated with the availability of other protection options and
should not be prejudicial to trade dress protection in instances in which the design truly operates
as a source indicator.
238. See Landscape, 113 F.3d at 380 (articulating a claim which covers an entire line of
products places upon plaintiff the particularly difficult challenge).
239. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1943)
(Judge Jerome Frank), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943) ("there is a basic public policy, deep-
rooted in our economy and respected by the courts, resting on the assumption that social welfare
is best advanced by free competition .... ").
240. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) ("free
exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which protection ... is the exception"). Id. at 151. See
also MCCARTHY, supra note 48 at § 1.15[2].
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designer children's clothes. If the products are sufficiently innovative
and unique they will be competitive in the market, and company A's
innovation will be rewarded. Thus there is no need to protect.
On the other hand, creation of a product requires substantial
investment, of both capital and talent. The risk that competitors will
copy designs, enter the market and drive prices down to the
competitors' marginal costs, makes the prospect of profit uncertain,
241
thereby discouraging creation and investment. As company A's story
shows, this scenario is very real. Because in design, the creative,
innovative element is on public display, copying is easy.
Furthermore, technology and globalization have created the means for
competitors to copy and bring to market copies of the originators'
goods at lower prices in record time.242  All this long before the
originator can recoup his investment or gain sufficient market share
so as not to be vulnerable.
Let's assume that company A's design does not satisfy (1) the
novelty requirements of a design patent, that (2) its product is new
and no secondary meaning can be established, and that (3) its design
has no copyright protection because the ornamental aspect is so
intertwined with the utilitarian aspect that they cannot be conceptually
separated. In this case Company A has zero protection against
Company B's admitted copying.
While there is a distinct sense of unfairness here, unfairness
alone will not support protection. One court points out, "as our
ambience becomes more merchandized and banal, it would be
unfortunate if we were to discourage use of a spark of originality
241. Brown explains that:
[F]ree-riding copiers may diminish investment in socially useful innovation. If
the product is one that requires substantial investment, whether of capital or of
talent, the investment may not be made if the prospect of profit, cloudy at best, is
made more risky by the likelihood that competitors will enter, drive prices down
to their marginal costs, and leave the originator with no return on her sunk costs
and with no hope of profits that will balance the risk of failure.
Brown, supra note 17, at 1386.
242. Counterfeiting-In Praise of the Real Thing, THE ECONOMIST, May 17, 2003 at 12
(Copying
is a profitable business: it needs no R&D and no expensive advertising
campaigns. Just copy a popular product, sell it at a discount and rake in the
returns. This simple business model, when combined with new technologies, free
trade and the rising value of brands, is opening a far broader range of consumer
goods and markets to enterprising copycats).
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which could transform an ordinary product into one of grace. ,,243 If
society recognizes promotion of this "spark of originality" as a
desirable policy goal, and wishes to encourage this type of invention,
then an exception to the norm of free competition is warranted.244
THE "CARROT" OF STATUTORY PROTECTION MODELS
So far the U.S. has not adopted legislation to protect design, with
the exception of a very narrow provision benefiting vessel hull design
owners. However, other countries, with whom the U.S. trades,
including the European Union, have implemented such provisions.
Indeed, the TRIPS Agreement, of which the U.S. is a signatory,
mandates implementation of design protection. The U.S. legislative
action could resolve company A's dilemma and present owners with
options other than design patent, trademark, or copyright, none of
which offer the requisite protection.
1. TRIPS - Industrial Designs
Articles 25 and 26 of TRIPS provide for protection of industrial
design. Article 25(1) imposes requirements of novelty, originality and
non-functionality. Article 26 grants the owner the right to prohibit
others from "making, selling or importing articles bearing or
embodying a design which is a copy or substantially a copy of the
protected design." The duration of the protection is for a minimum of
10 years.
245
The U.S. enacted amendments to conform to TRIPS in a law
passed on December 8, 1994,246 but did not include an industrial
design law. The perception was that existing mechanisms would
suffice to provide protection.
247
243. Brown, supra note 17, at 1387 (quoting Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822,
825 (3d Cir. 1981)).
244. If granted, protection would have to be very closely tailored to the needs of the design
originator and to afford protection solely to the extent necessary to accomplish the desired
policy goal.
245. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 25-26, Apr.
15, 1994 [hereinafter TRIPS].
246. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. V, 108 Stat. 4809,
4973-90 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., and 35
U.S.C.).
247. The Clinton Administration and Congress considered the need for enacting the
industrial design provision and concluded that "protection currently available under U.S. patent
and copyright law meets the requirements of these [TRIPS industrial design] articles." See
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Uruguay Round Table
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2. European Union Design Directive and Regulation
248
The European Union's protection of designs is contained in the
Community Design Directive 249  and the Community Design
250Regulation.
The Directive and Regulation collectively require novelty and
individual character. I2 5  "Individual character" is defined as the
overall impression a design produces on the informed user that differs
from the overall impression produced by other publicly available
design. 2  Registered design protection is renewable for up to 25
years; unregistered design is protected for 3 years. 3  The
registrations are administered by the Office of Harmonization of the
Internal Market (OHIM), effective January of 2003.
3. Gebrauchsmuster and Geschmacksmuster
German law provides an interesting dual model for protection for
design.
The Gebrauchsmuster (utility model or petty patent) covers
inventions which are new, involve an inventive step and can be
applied in the industry.254 The level of inventiveness is somewhat
lower than that required for regular patent protection.21' The law
specifically excludes processes. Registration is based on a cursory
review by the German Patent Office to ensure that the invention
generally meets the stated requirements.2 56 A regular patent type
examination is not undertaken, unless a cancellation proceeding is
Agreements, Texts of Agreements Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action and
Required Supporting Statements 1-2 (1994).
248. For a more detailed discussion of the European Design Directive and Regulation see
Thomas Hoeren, The European Union Commission and Recent Trends in European Information
Law, 29 RUTGERs COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (2003).
249. Council Directive 98/71 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28 [hereinafter Community Design
Directive].
250. Council Regulation 6/2002 on Community Designs, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1 [hereinafter
Community Design Regulation]. "Design" is defined as the "appearance of the whole or a part of
a product resulting from the features of, in particular, the lines, contours, colours, shape, texture
and/or materials of the product itself and/or its ornamentation." Community Design Regulation
at art. 3.
251. Id. at art. 5-6.
252. Id. at art. 6.
253. Id. at art. 10.
254. § 1 GbmG (Gebrauchsmustergesetz).
255. Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 151, 158 (1999).
256. Applicants may take advantage of the filing date of an earlier patent application. In
the event the patent is not granted, the Gebrauchsmuster can still issue effective the patent filing
date. § 5 GbmG.
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initiated. The protection term is short (three years from the
application date, renewable for an additional three-year term).
257
The Gebrauchsmuster is expressly designed for three
dimensional movable articles, and has as its objective "to prevent
third parties from duplicating the external configurations of certain
handtools and other everyday implements whose creative contribution
fall chronically short of the inventive height that the mature patent
paradigm required., 258  German companies typically use this
protection method to protect the designs of such items as cars or car
parts.259
A second option for design protection under German law is the
Geschmacksmuster (industrial design or model). It applies to articles
which are new and individual (i.e. the product of individual
independent creation). 260  The Geschmacksmuster protects the
aesthetic configuration of two or three dimensional articles of
practical utility, whose configuration is not determined by functional
criteria. Articles covered are objects of daily use, such as furniture,
jewelry, textiles, electronics or the shape of machines or vehicles.
Protection is granted by the German Patent Office without
examination, upon simple registration and deposit. 261 The initial term
is 5 years, renewable for a total term of not more than 20 years.26 2
4. US Design Legislation
In the US attempts to introduce design laws go back to the
beginning of the twentieth century. Bills have been introduced into
Congress for amendment of the Copyright Act proposing a sui generis
law related to copyright. However the 1976 Copyright Act failed to
include a design protection provision.2 63 In the mid and late 80's,
efforts to introduce a similar provision failed again.26 Interest in the
issue waned for a while, until passage of the only form of statutory
257. Janis, supra note 255. See also I DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.06[2],
at 3-192 (2003).
258. J. H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual
Property Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 797, 808 (1992).
259. Interview with Karl Heinz Baumann, Senior automotive designer, Daimler Chrysler
AG.
260. § 1 GeschmMG (Geschmacksmustergesetz ). The German term "eigentuemlich"
rendered here as individual, means, in literal translation "peculiar."
261. Donald S. Chisum, Patents § 3.06(2), at 3-107 (1992).
262. § 7a. GeschmMG.
263. Brown, supra note 17, at 1396.
264. Id.
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design protection in the U.S., the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act
in 1998.
The Vessel Hull Design Protection Act (VHDPA),2 65 was passed
as part of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA),26 6 in
reaction to the Supreme Court decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 267 (although nothing in that decision
prevented a vessel hull designer from obtaining copyright or trade
dress protection). The VHDPA creates a sui generis industrial design
law. The law provides that "the designer or other owner of an
original design of a useful article which makes the article attractive or
distinctive in appearance to the purchasing or using public may secure
the protection provided by this chapter". 268 This law is premised on
copyright principles and requires designs to be original and non-
functional.26 9 The protection lasts for 10 years.270
This law could in fact be a well tailored solution for company
A's needs. It would overcome the conceptual separability and
secondary meaning hurdles, it would avoid the procedural
complexities of obtaining a design patent, it would include protection
against copying, and it would grant protection for about the right
duration. The only problem is that under this law, protection is
limited to a "vessel hull, including a plug or mold., 27 1 Thus, unless
company A happens to be a producer of vessel hulls, it is out of luck.
It has been suggested that the VHDPA could be easily expanded to
cover industrial design, including automobile body and part designs,
furniture designs, and clothing designs.272 However no progress has
been made to date.
The following will briefly summarize some of the features of the
statutes listed above. These features are compared to the elements of
trade dress protection. Both methods of protection are viewed in light
of the minimum requirements that will give a design owner a
sufficient headstart in the market. The chart consists of two levels.
265. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1301(West 2002).
266. Id. at § 1201.
267. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
268. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (a)(1) (West 2002).
269. Id. at §§ 1302(1) and 1305(a).
270. Id. at §§ 1308 and 1309.
271. Id at § 1302 (b)(2).
272. Richard G. Frenkel, Intellectual Property In the Balance: Proposals for Improving
Industrial Design Protection in the Post-TRIPS Era, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 531, 577 n.309
(1999) (citing Letter from Peter Jaszi of the Digital Future Coalition to Pat Roberts, United
States Senator 2 (Aug. 24, 1998)).
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The first addresses the design owner's needs for protection, the
second contains the elements necessary to ensure that protection
granted does not become anticompetitive.
Design ] Trade Dress Product Design
Owner's Needs Law
Minimum Protection Protection Protection against
protection for against copying against copying or
design owner confusion in the making/using/sell
marketplace ing
Simple Registration Registration/depo
mechanism of subject to proof sit without




Limitations on Non- Non- Non-functionality
protection functionality functionality
Aesthetic Ability to Novelty,
qualities that indicate source individual
merit protection character
Limited Indefinite 3-25 years
duration duration
Notice to third USPTO - only Patent Office,




The areas of clash between trade dress and design protection are
in the nature of the protection afforded, the registration mechanism,
the aesthetic qualities required and the duration. In each of these
categories specialized product design laws offer a better solution. A
more detailed analysis of the existing industrial design protection
laws is beyond the scope of this paper. However, even a brief look at
the type of tool these industrial design laws offer, makes it clear that
adoption of such a law would avoid the threats to innovation and
competition inherent in the current system.
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THE "STICK" OF PERPETUAL MONOPOLIES
So far we have created monopolies for Superman dolls,
273
Tarkay posters,274 the Tarzan trademark2 75 and removed them from
the public domain for the foreseeable future, if not forever. Morever,
the door is wide open to the creation of many more such monopolies.
Plaintiffs are encouraged to seek "trade dress protection for an entire
product line by establishing that the 'overall look' in each separate
product is consistent. ' '276  They are encouraged to appropriate an
artist's visual style, and trademark their musical performances.
The "type of look" has created a doctrine which may have
potentially uncontrollable ramifications for the industrial design
market. Design of leather luggage, children's clothes and the like has
been monopolized. Romm Art granted a hybrid protection that
created exclusive property in artistic style.277  It transcends the well
thought out and balanced policy rationales of the established doctrines
and is immune to their limitations. 278 The EMI-Oliveira line of cases
is on its way to establish similar inroads in the area of music.
Inroads of this type of protection into the cultural arena are
particularly disturbing. If perpetual protection under trademark were
273. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (granting registration of
drawings of Superman and Batman as trademarks for dolls representing these figures). See
Brown, supra note 17, at 1370 ("[T]he function of a Superman doll is to be a Superman doll."
Allowing protection is "tantamount to saying the figures are trademarks of themselves ....
What the court has done in DC Comics, since trademarks can last forever, is to safeguard
Superman from ever facing the rough-and-tumble of the public domain, which might undo even
Superman").
274. Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. N.Y. 1992).
275. Edgar Rice Burroughs v. Manns Theaters, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
276. Yurman Design, 262 F.3d at 116. Plaintiff "must articulate the design elements that
compose the trade dress ... the level of generality at which a trade dress is described as well as
the fact that a similar trade dress is already being used by manufacturers of other kinds of
products, may indicate that the dress is no more than a concept or idea to be applied to particular
products." The court goes on to say that it would not have been able to decide whether Milstein
trade dress is generic, without specific description of elements protected. See Jeffrey Milstein v.
Greger, Lawlor, Roth 58 F 3d 27 (2 d Cir. 1995).
277. MCCARTHY, supra note 48 at § 8.01[4] n.22 ("artistic style is no one's exclusive
property"). See also Leigh v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1382 (S.D.
Ga. 1998) ("Under copyright law, plaintiff is not entitled to protection of his idea (the use of a
forlorn cemetery statue to represent final judgment).., an expansive application of the
principles of trademark law as in Romm Art would allow plaintiff the very protection denied him
under copyright law").
278. See Denicola, supra note 7, at 1670 (protection of industrial design, unless kept
firmly tied to source recognition as a trademark, easily slides into an unpredictable system of
monopoly awards for successful designs, uninhibited by the statutory standards of copyright law
or design patent law") See also Jeffrey Milstein v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir.
1995).
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to extend to visual arts and musical compositions, the public domain
would be seriously diminished. The public domain consists of
material added on by each generation, for subsequent generations to
draw upon, just as our society draws upon art ranging from
Michelangelo to the impressionists, and music from Bach to
Stravinsky. If "style" becomes property, anyone painting in Jackson
Pollock's "drip and splat" style would be infringing a perpetually
protected trade dress. Well known popular songs by composers and
performers such as Gershwin, Elvis, the Beatles, etc. would never
pass into the public domain. In a generation or two the public domain
would be depleted of creations which represent our times.
CONCLUSION
Efforts to "squeeze" new forms of IP into old protection
mechanisms lead to results that upset the delicate balance between
free competition and protection that underlies our IP laws. The
anomalous results obtained in the area of protection of "type of look"
of product design under a trade dress doctrine may be a temporary
maladjustment in the constant rebalancing that is part of creating IP
protection. However, it may herald a new era of protectionism, of
liberal grants of rights at the expense of free competition. It is time to
look for alternatives which better meet the needs of product design
than does current trade dress law.
279
279. Among the alternatives to be considered are the industrial design laws passed in
various countries, including the United States Vehicle Hull Design Protection Act. Its expansion
to products other than vessel hulls would be an "easy fix" for an acute problem.

